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Plaintiffs and Appellants Charles F. Hale and Beverly I. Hale ("Hales"), by
counsel, submit the following reply brief in the above-referenced appeal.
INTRODUCTION
The heart of the parties5 dispute in this matter was purely arithmetical: the proper
accounting for costs and payments in connection with the construction of two homes built
as part of the unified construction project on Lots 45 and 4o, Triple Crown Estates, in
South Jordan, Utah. The Consolidated Brief of Defendants and Appellees Big H
Construction, Inc. and Dwayne Horsley ("Consol. Brief) tries mightily to suspend the
trial court's ruling from credibility issues, invoking gratuitous language from the court's
Findings and Conclusions (R. 2105-2162, prepared by Defendants5 counsel); by so doing,
Defendants seek to frame legal errors as factual, in hopes that this Court will simply
discard them. But their arguments are a smokescreen, intended to obscure the fact that
the trial court adopted an untenable, hybridized financial analysis which (1) ignored onehalf of the balance sheet (specifically, the total amounts paid), and (2) permitted
Defendants to recover for items that cannot, as a matter of law, be considered "costs."
This case must be remanded with instructions to take the costs, deduct the duplicates and
mistaken invoices, deduct the overpayments and the underpayments, deduct the
impermissible costs, deduct the warranty items, and then add the total payments.
Defendants attempt to mask the trial court's fundamental accounting errors by
claiming that the evidence somehow showed the "reasonableness" of the costs which they
claimed. But the "reasonableness" of costs is meaningless without considering the total
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payments. Costs in a cost-plus building contract should, as a matter of law, be shown by
the actual expenditures, rather than mere estimations of value. And, as a matter of law,
reasonable costs are only those that Defendants paid unless they overpaid an invoice, in
which case it is only the invoiced amount. When Big H paid a subcontractor more than
the subcontractor requested, that is not a reasonable costs as a matter of law, and when
Big H underpaid an invoice, the full amount cannot be considered reasonable.
Defendants also acknowledge that there are duplicate and mistaken invoices, but
assert that only the builder's profit portion of those mistakes should be considered.
However, that arithmetic repeats the accounting errors. These are invoices that were
added to the "costs" twice and were designated as having been paid with the Hales'
funds. Crediting only ten percent back to the Hales does not make them whole.
Finally, Defendants attempt to characterize the overpayments and underpayments
as an issue of fact, for which the Hales did not marshal the evidence. But, just last year,
this Court made it clear that the definition of "costs" in a contract and whether such costs
are reasonable is an issue of law, reviewed for correctness.
ARGUMENT
POINT L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN ITS CALCULATION OF DAMAGES.

The trial court's first error was its calculation of damages without considering total
costs versus total payments.1 This was an error of law, not fact:

Throughout the construction, Defendants were receiving funds directly from the Hales
and through draws on the Hales' loans. See R. 2111, 2114-2115, 2118 (referring to the
loans and the Hales' personal expenditures).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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[The defendant] argues that the trial court used an incorrect method to
calculate damages arising from his inability to access the Wasatch pipeline
prior to July 2005. 'Whether the district court applied the correct rule for
measuring damages is a question of law that we review for correctness.'
Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Reott, 2011 UT App. 152 at f 10, - P.3d --.
In her Minute Entry, the trial court: recognized that Defendants' expert testified
that "the builder's fee for Lot 45 should be the sum of $ 149,425." R. 1731 (Note that the
mechanic's lien amount was $165,000.) Instead of using that figure, though, the court
added together the costs indicated in Exhibits RR and SS, determining that the costs
"totaled $2,740,649." Id. The court then multiplied that figure by ten percent and
deducted a $100,000 builder's profit payment (R. 1732), concluding that Defendants
were entitled to $174,000 for the builder's profit on Lot 45. 2
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by Defendants' counsel,
the damages were calculated by an entirely different method. First, the Findings accepted
the determination of John Lipzinski, Hales' cost analysis expert, that Defendants' total
costs were $2,414,843. Yet the Findings then set this figure aside, and consider only the
invoices from Exh. RR (the Lot 45 costs), which total $1,721,000. This the trial court
multiplied by ten percent, ruling that Defendants were entitled to $172,100 in builder's
profit.3 Even setting aside the differences between the Minute Entry and the Findings of

2

R. 1731-1732.
R. 2119. Another portion of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, without
explanation, states that Big H was entitled to a fee of $162,875. R. 2118.

3
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Fact and the peculiar reference in the Findings to a $162,875 fee,4 the numbers within the
rulings are internally inconsistent.
First, the trial court held that the total cost for both houses was $2,414,843, and the
total cost for Lot 45 was $1,721,000. Deducting the Lot 45 costs from the total would
leave a cost balance for Lot 46 of only $693,843; yet, in the Minute Entry, trial court
ruled that the Hales paid $100,000 in builder's profit - more than $30,000 too much if it
was applied only to the Lot 46 house. Even the addition of the Lot 46 land cost back into
the equation (which would be improper as a matter of law - see Point III below) cannot
explain the discrepancy. The trial court's finding that "the Hales have not paid any
portion of the $172,100 fee owed to Big H as of early December 2004" (R. 2121 at f 38)5
must be deemed error as a matter of law.
Second, the Findings of Fact adopt the calculation of $2,414,843 as "the total
costs" (R. 2119 \ 35) - yet if Appellee Big H's total invoiced costs from Exhibits RR and
SS are added together, they claim $2,740,649.40 for costs on both projects. R. 1731.
Neither the Findings nor the Minute Entry explain the $325,806.40 difference. Even if
the land costs are removed from the totals in Exhibits RR and SS {see Point III below),
there is still a variance of nearly $57,000. There is only one explanation: there were

4

R.2118.
Defendants assert that the Hales did not sufficiently marshal the evidence. This is both
the incorrect standard of review, and factually incorrect. See Hales' Opening Brief
pp. 21-24, 29-30, and 34-35. The lower court's analysis relied on figures in Exhibits RR
and SS, which Defendant/Appellee Dwayne Horsley testified were a comprehensive
accounting of the project (R. 2801 at 106-108), and that Defendants had been paid no
builder's profit on Lot 45 (R. 2801 at 74). The remaining analysis was the trial court's
own.
5
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duplicate invoices (as Defendants acknowledge - see Consol Brief dX 27-29; pp. 12-13
below).
The methodology to calculate damages is fundamentally flawed because it
requires the assumption that the payments from. Hales' funds were equal to the costs
accounted for in Exhibits RR and SS. However, the Findings of Fact themselves
acknowledge that Defendants had not included all of the payments in its spreadsheets.
R. 2118, Consol Brief'at 14 % 7. The trial court's calculations erred as a matter of law
because they did not consider the total costs against the total payments.
In short, this case must be remanded with instructions to add the total costs, deduct
the duplicates and mistaken invoices, deduct the overpayments and the underpayments,
deduct the impermissible costs, deduct the warranty items, and then add the total
payments.
POINT II.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DAMAGES FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND INCORRECT
AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The Trial Court's Analysis Failed to Account Properly for Documented
Payments Versus Documented Expenditures.
As noted above, the trial court's cost analysis began with a finding, ostensibly

based on the testimony of Mr. Lipzinski, that Appellee Big H Construction, Inc.'s final
accountings (Exhibits RR and SS) were "consistent with each other - in other words, that
every item for which the Hales were invoiced had a corresponding value that was
incorporated in their Lot 45 home." (R. 2119 at \ 34.) Yet the lower court then
disregarded unrefuted testimony concerning errors and duplications in those exhibits.

0849^0 1
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1.

Improper Analysis of Invoices

First, the court's finding that Mr. Lipzinski accepted the accuracy of Exhibits RR
and SS is not supported by the evidence; in fact, it is refuted his express testimony:6
Q:
Last foundational question on Exhibits 33 and 34. Did you discover
errors in those documents? Just yes or no.
A:

Yes, sir, I did.

Q:
Did you also find that there were documents later discovered that
were not included in those?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
So based on your review of the accounting work that you've now
identified, did you form an opinion concerning the adequacy of Big H's job
accounting?
A:

Yes, sir, we have.

Q:

And is that the opinion you stated earlier on?

A:

It is.

Q:
Okay. Do you feel that the accounting work was adequate for the
purposes?
A:

No, I do not.

R. 2801 at p. 158 1.23-p. 1591. 13.
Second, the trial court's finding that Mr. Lipzinski concluded that "every item for
which the Hales were invoiced had a corresponding value that was incorporated in their

"[T]he Hales' expert, Mr. Lipzinski, did not testify that there were any inaccuracies in
Big H's final accounting (Exhs. RR and SS)." R. 2118-19. As discussed in the opening
brief, and in support of the marshalling requirement, it is true that Mr. Lipzinski did not
testify regarding errors in RR and SS. But, Exh. D- RR and SS are identical to P-33 and
34.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Lot 45 Home" is also not supported by the evidence.7 To the contrary, Mr. Lipzinski's
analysis made clear that $72,735.16 were completely unsupported, and therefore not
properly includable in a cost-plus analysis under prevailing industry standards:
Q.
You then have a line item that says less unsupported costs, and it
references Schedule 3. This appears to be a deduction of $72,73 5.16.
Would you walk the court through why you have unsupported costs on
Schedule 3, and what they represent?
A.
Okay. What Schedule 3 represents - it's actually unnecessary,
unnecessary or mismanaged costs. It represents things that are charged to a
wrong job number, or basically does not - was not charged to the Hale
properties. It also represents unsupported invoice information that we were
never able to glean that information out of any of the documents that we
received. And what that does, just so that you know, is that we have added
up that value that shows up there is actually added to the value on - the
total value on Exhibit 2, and then just reduce back off just clarification
purposes. But basically between Schedule 3 and Schedule 2, that
represents all the invoices that we've received Q.

So if the court were to compare --

A.

Or information.

Q.
I'm sorry. If the court were to compare Schedule 2 and 3, it would
find all of the unsupported cost items on Schedule 3 reflected as invoiced
amounts on Schedule 2?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

But then backed out again?

A.

Right.

(R. 2801 at p. 167,1. 23-169,1. 1.) Defendants made no attempt to offer rebuttal
testimony that Mr. Lipzinski's deduction of unsupported costs was unwarranted.
7

In support of the marshalling requirement, Defendants' expert testified essentially that
the Hales received more value than they paid. See Hales' Brief at 21-23. In addition, the
trial court found that Big H had not been repaid approximately $52,000 in loans. R.
2116.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendant/Appellee Dwayne Horsley, through all of his trial testimony, did not address a
single line item of Mr. Lipzinski's Schedule 3 in any way, claiming only that Exhibits RR
and SS were comprehensive and that he did not detect any duplicates (R. 2801 at pp. 53,
79-80 and 106-108). A deduction of $72,735.16 was mandated by law.
Thus, even without the trial court's improper inclusion of the overpayments and
underpayments (see subpoint B, below), improper inclusion of land costs in the
calculation (see Point III, below), inclusion of duplicate invoices (see Point IIB 3 below),
failure to credit a specific $30,000 builder's fee payment (see Point III, below), and
improper exclusion of repair costs (see Point V, below), the trial court's analysis started
with an erroneous assumption: the total payments could not be simply ignored because it
is undisputed that Exhibits RR and SS do not reflect those totals. From the very outset,
therefore, the trial court's analysis was flawed.
2.

Improper Application of Payments

The trial court's analysis failed on the payments side of the ledger by omitting
entirely the total of payments on the project. Once the court determined the total amount
of invoices, and allocated $1,721 million of those invoices to Lot 45, it simply walked
away from the undisputed analysis of actual payments received: $2,375,507.99 (R. 2803
at 2-19). This number was arrived at by accounting for all payments actually made on
the project (Schedule 9), less amounts paid by Big H directly (Schedule 8), plus amounts
reimbursed to Big H by Hales (Schedule 9), plus fees paid by Big H (Schedule 9). Id.
Again, Defendants offered no evidence to refute Mr. LipzinskVs figures in this
regard. Other than $30,000 of the builder's fees identified by Hales as such (see
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Point III, below), Defendants appear to have accepted Mr. Lipzinski's figure in this
regard.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Considering the Full Amount of the Payment
Where Big H Overpaid Invoices and the Full Amount of the Invoice
Where Big H Underpaid the Invoice.
As part of his testimony at trial, Mr. Lipzinski deducted two categories of costs

from Defendants' allowable claim: instances where Defendants' payment was less than
the invoiced amount (in which case they were credited only with the paid amount), and
instances where the payment amount exceeded the invoiced amount (in which case they
were credited with the invoice amount) (R. 2803 at 2-19).
Defendants' only counter to Hales' analysis of the underpayments and
overpayments is that Hales did not marshal the evidence. The court's error here, though,
was again one of law. Hales were charged for the full amount of the payment where Big
H paid more than an invoice, and the foil amount of the invoice where Big H underpaid
an invoice. The question for this court is whether such charges can correctly be
considered reasonable costs within the meaning of the parties' cost-plus contract. This,
again, is an issue of law.
In Dale K. Barker Co., PC v. John K. Bushnell, 2010 UT App. 189, 237 P.3d 903
at ^f 16, the court was called upon to interpret the meaning of the term "costs" in a
contract. "'The trial court's interpretation of the meaning of 'costs' and 'fees' in the
contract is a question of law.'" Id. (quoting Kraatz v. Heritage Imps., 2003 UT App. 201,
Tf 24, 71 P.3d 188). "Although the contract referred to 'all costs,' costs, like attorney fees,
must be reasonable." Id. And, in that case, the Court of Appeals specifically instructed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the trial court not to consider certain items that were duplicative and thereby deemed
unreasonable. Id. at f 18. In their Opening Brief, Hales presented clear authority that
such charges are unreasonable as a matter of law and cannot be considered "costs" for a
cost plus contract. Opening Brief at 30-31. As such, the trial court erred in including
them in the damages calculation.8
1.

Excluding the Overpayments and Underpayments (Schedule 1)
Does Not Result in a "Double Dip."

As drafted by Defendants' counsel, the trial court's Findings concluded that Mr.
Lipzinski's Schedule 11 treatment of underpayments and overpayments "constitutes an
improper double counting (double dip)." (R. 2127). The court's conclusion, though, is
incorrect as a matter of law. Mr. Lipzinski's Schedule 2 (as found by the trial court itself
- R. 2119) constitutes a comprehensive list of all invoices in connection with the project.
Schedule 9, in turn, itemizes all payments made by or on behalf of Hales. R. 2127.
Schedule 11 does not duplicate either of these Schedules; it simply deducts the net
amounts by which invoices were discounted (the discount to be credited to Hales) or by
which invoices were overpaid (in which case the amount of overpayment was likewise
credited to Hales). Only the amounts of overpayment or underpayment are accounted for
in Schedule 11 - not the entire amount of the invoices or payments. Yet Hales are
credited for the full amount of payments, whether made to (or on behalf of) Defendants
on the project, or whether allocated elsewhere. Similarly, Hales were credited for the
discounts realized against invoices separately listed in Schedule 2, but only for the

R. 21261 50 b,cii.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

amount of the discounts themselves, under Schedule 11. This was clearly explained
during cross-examination (see R. 2802 at pp. 44-47); again, Defendants offered no
analysis refuting that fact.
2.

Overpayments and Underpayments Should Not Be "Netted Out"
as a Matter of Law.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law concluded that the underpayments
and overpayments uat the very least, should be netted out against each other." R. 2128.
This again is conceptually erroneous. For example, if Big H was invoiced $100, but used
the Hales' loan funds to pay $150, and if, in another instance, Big H was invoiced $100,
but negotiated with the subcontractor and paid only $50 of the Hales5 fund. Under the
trial court's analysis, there should be no adjustment to the overall costs or payments
because these items - the +$50 and the -$50 payments would "cancel out." In reality,
Hales should not have had to pay the extra $50 - since the subcontractor did not charge it,
Hales cannot legally be said to have incurred it. By the same token, Big H should not
keep the $50 that it did not pay to the second subcontractor. That amount cannot be
considered reasonable as a matter of law if Big H did not deem it worthy of payment.
It is noteworthy, in this regard, that Defendants' own expert confirmed the
propriety of this analysis. On cross-examination, Defendants' expert, Robert Nielson,
was asked concerning whether a deduction for discounted payments over invoiced
amounts was appropriate in a cost-plus contract analysis, and confirmed it expressly:
Q:
Would it be fair to say that if on any of the invoices in the binder
you reviewed Big H actually paid less than the face invoice amount, it
should be what Big H paid not the invoice amount that should be the basis
of the builder's fee?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

oc/mn 1

09057.0002

A:
Unless they have a contractual arrangement that allows them to
benefit from discounts that they can get, yes.
Q:
That would be a correct assessment, wouldn't it? Because actual cost
is actual cost, not invoice cost, but paid cost?
A:

Yes.

R. 2803 at p. 1271. 12-p. 128 1. 2.
3.

The Full Value of the Duplicates and Mistaken Invoices Must be
Considered.

Defendants concede that there are duplicate and mistaken invoices, but attempt to
minimize the effect of the duplicates by pseudo-accounting which again does not
properly credit Hales' payments. See Consol. Brief at 28-29. Defendants concede that
the CJ Heating invoice is a duplicate, and that Hales should be given a credit for it. Id. at
29. But, the full amount of the duplicate ($17,985) must be deducted from the analysis to
properly credit the Hales for their payment, not just the ten percent builder's profit.
Defendants contend that the RT Custom Cabinets invoices are duplicative of only
$1,264. Yet their own spreadsheet in Exhibit SS at page 4 shows:
^.«.»^.«w, .„*.

1 45

...V. UOUU.

R/r Custom Cabinets
il.T Custom Cabinets
R.T Custom Cabinets
R.T Custom Cabinets
R.T Custom Cabinets

R.T Custom Cabinets
R.T Custom Cabinets

Cabinets
Cabinets
Cabinets
Cabinets
Conntcnops
Payment
Payment

uciinir*~*- tvi u m o \„,i trfA-Jvtrt

r,cf-u

!ny#10M
InvSTO?!
inv#J072
Down Payment
Inv^IOI)
CH22114913 Beehive £21,000.00

41 rymy.jv

$21,000.00
$420.00
£360.00
51936.00
. $21,000.00

1-0-

j

-0^0-0'0-

Plainly, Big H entered Invoice #1011 twice, and the duplication was included in
the calculations. In addition, Big H counted a payment of $19,736 as a cost. The trial
court clearly erred in its calculation here. Defendants7 arguments regarding the down
payment are mistaken. The document shows that it was a payment for Lot 46. See
Exh SS at Tab 45, attached in part at Exhibit 1.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Hales must also be credited for $60,000 from Stroud Invoice No. 4601. The
Stroud invoice is only for $60,000. Exh. SS at 24. Some handwritten notes makes
reference to $120,000, and Big H's spreadsheets charged the Hales $120,000 for the
invoice. Without explanation, Defendants claim that is "simply $45.90 more than the
actual total." Consol Brief at 29. There is no finding that justifies the increase from
$60,000 to $120,000. The court clearly erred in considering the $120,000, and the Hales
must be given credit for their full payment.
In all, $118,721 in duplications appear from the face of the very documents
adopted by the trial court, and need to be deducted from a proper costs-vs-payments
analysis.
4.

Overpayments Were Properly Deducted.

Defendants' final claim, that Hales' overpayments were improperly deducted from
Hales5 overpayment amount, is unclear. Apparently, Defendants believe that
Mr. Lipzinski's accounting here results in deduction of $80,347.88, whereas only a tenth
of that figure should have been deducted. If Defendants' invitation is accepted, though,
and overpayments are deducted from the Adjusted Costs of the Work to reach the actual
cost on which Defendants' builder's profit is calculated, the amount of overpayment is
increased, not decreased. In either event, the trial court's disregard of overpayments
entirely constitutes clear and reversible error as a point of law.
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C.

The Trial Court Improperly Deferred to "Reasonable Costs" in Deference
to Actual Accounting Figures.
Having failed to rebut the validity of Hales' actual job cost accounting,

Defendants fell back on (and the trial court adopted) the arguments that:
Mr. Lipzinski found no evidence that any billed cost was excessive,
unreasonable or above-market;... that Mr. Nielson confirmed the
reasonableness of the costs through his two (change order and comparable
price per square foot) analysis; and . . . the total amount of costs for the
Lot 45 home is close to its appraised fair market value.
R. 2120 at f 37. The trial court's reasoning here, though, disregards the superior
accuracy of an actual cost analysis over "value received/5 and erroneously attributes an
after-the-fact real estate appraisal as probative of actual costs incurred on the project.
Neither approach is viable or tenable.
1.

Actual Cost Versus Reasonable Value

All experts presenting evidence to the court agreed on one fundamental
proposition: The most reliable and valid measure of a builder's charge under a cost-plus
contract is the actual and reasonable costs incurred on the job. Mr. Lipzinski's testimony
was clear and unequivocal in this regard (see R. 2801 at p. 138); Mr. Nielson, similarly,
openly acknowledged that actual costs should be relied upon where they are available:
Q:
But I believe you testified in your deposition that neither of these
methods is anywhere near as reliable as actual invoices; isn't that correct?
A:

I would still - yes, I would still say t h a t . . . .

Q:
And wouldn't be even better to look at actual invoices against actual
payments to determine what actual costs were?
A:

Yes. Easier said than done, but yes.

R. 2803 at p. 1341. 21-p. 135 1. 12.
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Defendants, though, apparently believe that this is irrelevant. They rely heavily
and repeatedly on the decision of Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2009 Utah
81, 222 P.3d 1165, for the proposition that, under Utah law, both Defendants and the trial
court were entitled to disregard actual and valid cost analysis in favor of "reasonable
cost" testimony (Consol. Brief at pp. 2, 4, 19, 20, and 25). Thus, even though Hales cited
the Court to numerous cases from around the country and a well-regarded treatise which
all state that Defendants should have proven the reasonableness of expenditures through
actual costs and payments, Defendants assert that the Traco Steel Erectors holding makes
evidence of record, showing actual costs and payments, either optional or irrelevant.
However, Defendants err in their interpretation of and reliance on Traco.
Traco dealt with a unique situation not present before this Court. In that case, a
steel erection subcontractor entered into two fixed price subcontracts with a general
contractor for the performance of steel erection work on two state college projects. The
subcontractor then abandoned the projects, and claimed additional payment. The general
contractor counterclaimed for its costs incurred in completion. The trial court accepted
the general contractor's damages evidence in the form of average cost data from RS
Means Building Construction Cost Data - which the general contractor testified, without
objection, reflected actual costs - and testimony on average hourly rates of its employees
(2009 UT 81 at f 1). The subcontractor offered no actual cost evidence, having failed to
subpoena it timely.
Without marshaling evidence (Id at ^[3), the subcontractor challenged the
adequacy of the evidence supporting the trial court's damages award. The Court of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Appeals affirmed, and the Utah Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals on certiorari.
Concerning the sufficiency of evidence supporting a damages award, the Utah Supreme
Court began by observing that:
As a general matter, "the desired objective is to evaluate any loss suffered
by the most direct, practical and accurate method that can be employed"
Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 22 Utah 2d 49, 448 P.2d 709, 711 (1968).
Id. at <| 8 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court concluded that, given the lack of
marshaled evidence concerning more reliable bases for the trial court's award, the sole
question before it was whether, standing alone, the evidence derived from RS Means and
testimony concerning average wages was legally sufficient. The court concluded that it
was:
In our view, the record leaves no room to doubt that reasonable minds
might believe from the preponderance of the evidence that the damages
presented by Comtrol through time cards, the RS Means average, and the
testimony were actually suffered.
. . . Had Traco timely subpoenaed Comtrol's payroll records, it is possible
that such payroll records may have contradicted the evidence presented by
Comtrol. Unfortunately, Traco failed to timely subpoena the payroll
records and presented no other evidence, besides conflicting testimony and
deposition exhibits, that the hourly rated $50.68 did not reflect the actual
cost incurred for the labor and machinery required to complete Traco's
work.
Id. at \ 26. In short, the Traco decision supports Hales' contention that actual costs
incurred - not estimates or values - are the proper measure of damages. Where evidence
ofactual cost, and of actual payments is not only presented but undisputed, the Traco
holding does not justify throwing out the whole in favor of "reasonableness."
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Also, Traco did allow evidence of averages to prove damages, but only where
there is also evidence that the averages accurately account for the project. Id. atfflf25,
26. The testimony stated that the average "actually reflected the costs incurred," and
plaintiff did not present contradictory evidence, arguing unsuccessfully that the evidence
was insufficient on its face. In this case, by contrast, Defendants failed as a matter of law
to provide a full and adequate accounting, as required by Traco. Instead, Defendants
presented two admittedly incomplete and plainly duplicative packets of invoices, and
then called an expert who testified that, in his opinion, the documented cost of the Lot 45
house was "reasonable" because in his view the Hales received more value than the
tabulated costs.9 But, it is undisputed that Big H did not present the total payments.10
Big H's expert did not attempt to determine how much was owed and to whom by
offsetting the actual costs against the actual payments; he did not consider one of the two
houses at all.11
Note, moreover, that in Traco, the court stated, "We are aware of no authority . ..
that restricts evidence that may be used to prove contract damages to primary
documentation of actual cash outlays to workers or suppliers, or that failure to do so
results in a failure to present a prima facie case of damages." Id. at f 23. In fact, there is
a volume of authority holding that, in the context of cost-plus contracts, what may be
considered a "cost," and whether it was reasonable, can only be proved by actual invoices

9

R. 1731, R. 2120, R. 1322, R. 2803 at 92-96.
Consol.
BriefatU^l.
11
R. 2803 at 124.

l0
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and payment records.

Defendants seem to assert that Traco cannot be harmonized with

those cases, and that they should therefore simply be ignored. Traco, though, must be
read together with such other authority. With such a reading, Traco does not contradict
nationwide authority more directly on point with the facts of this case. The only proper
reading of Traco, giving due consideration to the national consensus, is that the evidence
before the court therein - in the absence of better evidence - was sufficient to prove
actual costs incurred.
Finally, Traco is also distinguishable as not dealing with a cost-plus contract with
a non-builder. The parties in Traco were industry insiders adjusting payments under a
fixed-price contract. Hales' cited case law involved individual homeowners versus
contractors. See, e.g, Treen Const, Inc. v. Reasonover, 30 So.3d 933, 936 (La. App.
2009); Burdette v. Drushell, 837 So.2d 54, 59 (La. App. 2002); Freeman & Co. v. Bolt,
968 P.2d 247, 254 (Idaho App. 1998); Nolop v. Spettel, 64 N.W.2d 859, 863-864 (Wis.
1954); Forrest Const. Co., LLC v. Laughlin, 337 S.W.3d 211, *8, 2009 WL 4723365
(Term. App.). This distinction is pivotal in that cost-plus contracts give significant
discretion to the contractor. As such, contractors dealing with non-industry owners

Treen Const, Inc. v. Reasonover, 30 So. 3d 933, 936 (La. App. 2009); Burdette v.
Drushell, 837 So. 2d 54, 59 (La. App. 2002); Freeman & Co. v. Bolt, 968 P.2d 247, 254
(Idaho App. 1998); Arc Elec. Co., Inc. v. Esslinger-Lefler, Inc., 591 P.2d 989, 992 (Ariz.
App. 1979); Union Bldg. Corp. v. J&JBldg. & Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 578
S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Nolop v. Spettel, 64 N.W.2d 859, 863-864 (Wis.
1954); JBR Contractors, Inc. v.E&W, LLC, 2010 WL 802076, 991 A.2d 18 (unpub.);
Forrest Const Co., LLC v. Laughlin, 337 S.W.3d 211, *8, 2009 WL 4723365 (Term.
App.); 17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 495.
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should be viewed as quasi-fiduciaries; and, they must produce an accounting that is more
than a best guess.
2.

Appraisal Testimony

If estimates of building value were inadequate to demonstrate costs, fair market
value of the home as built, as estimated by a real estate appraisal performed after
construction was completed, was clearly inadequate in the face of contradictory actual
cost evidence, including (as it must) changes in the real estate market in the region.
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT'S INCLUSION OF LAND COSTS
IN ITS ANALYSIS CONSTITUTED AN
IMPERMISSIBLE AWARD OF A REAL ESTATE
COMMISSION TO DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS.
As a matter of law, Defendants cainnot be awarded a ten percent profit on the
cost of the land. It is undisputed that the parties' contracts do not refer to or authorize
such a profit.14
Defendants attempt a semantic avoidance of the Statute of Frauds15 by arguing that
a ten percent commission on the lots without any writing is valid because the lot was a

Defendants contend that the Hales failed to marshal the evidence on this issue;
however, the issue centers on the interpretation and application of statutes and the legal
definition of "costs," not on the sufficiency of the evidence. Even if every disputed fact
regarding the land is found in Defendants' favor, Defendants are still not entitled to
recover a profit on the land because there is not written contract supporting the profit and
Defendants are not authorized under the Real Estate Licensing and Practices Act. As
such, marshalling of evidence cannot be required. See Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC v. Reott,
2011 UT App. 152, Tf 2, - P.3d - (stating that the application of the Statute of Frauds is
reviewed for correctness).
14
None of the four contracts contain a provision authorizing a commission on the land or
relating to whether the land can be included as a "cost" for purposes of the builder's
profit Exhs. P-5, 6, 7, 8. The same is true of the addenda. Exhs. P-9, 10, 11.
15
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1, et seq.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"cost." But the Statute of Frauds is broad in its sweep. It requires that "every agreement
authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation" be in writing "signed by the party to be charged with the agreement."
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(5) (2003).16 "Compensation" means "something given or
17

received as an equivalent for services, debt, loss, injury, suffering, etc."
remuneration."

or "payment,

The Statute of Frauds also provides:

No estate or interest in real property ..., nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the
party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2003). Under the plain reading of the statute, whether the
claim is called a profit on a cost or a commission, Defendants cannot recover any fee
relating to the price of the lots.
The Real Estate Licensing and Practices Act ("the Licensing Act")19 also forbids
Defendants from claiming a profit on the lots. It is undisputed that Defendants are not
authorized real estate brokers or agents.

Defendants claim that the land was "acquired

with the professional assistance of David Horsley, a licensed real estate agent acting for

The Statute of Frauds was amended in 2004, but it did not change the substance of this
subsection.
17
www.dictionary.com.
Miriam Webster Dictionary available at www.m-w.com.
19
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2f-201, etseq. (2003).
20
There is no finding indicating that either Defendant is so licensed. See R. 1722-34,
2105-62. Defendants do not assert that they were so licensed at the time of the events in
question or at any time. See Consol Brief.
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Big H." However, the Licensing Act does not permit an unlicensed third-party to claim a
real estate commission.
No person may bring or maintain am action in any court of this state for the
recovery of a commission, fee or compensation for any act done or sendee
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to other than licensed
principal brokers, unless the person was duly licensed as a principal broker
at the time of the doing of the act or rendering the service.
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2f-409 (2003). Defendants are the parties seeking to "bring or
maintain an action in any court of this state for the recovery of a commission, fee or
compensation;" yet, they are "other than licensed principal brokers." A simple reading of
the plain language of the Licensing Act makes it clear that Defendants cannot claim a
commission on the cost of the lots.
In response to Plaintiffs argument that the Mechanic's Lien Act precludes land
costs from being included, Defendants argue that they may recover under the Mechanic's

{

Lien Act because they "rendered service[s]" in relation to the lots. Consol Brief at 28
n.20. Even if the contradictions in Defendants' semantics were overlooked, their
assertions fail as a matter of law. The Licensing Act prohibits Defendants from
recovering compensation for rendering services related to the purchase of lots, and there
is no other provision in the Mechanic's Lien Act that would permit Defendants such a
recovery.
Defendants also contend that the Hales waived these statutory arguments by not
asserting them as an affirmative defense at the start of the case. But Defendants'
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71

counterclaim does not indicate that Defendants claimed a profit on the sale of the land.
Hales cannot be expected to divine Defendants' mathematics at the pleadings stage indeed, Hales' Complaint sought an accounting because they did not know the basis of
Defendants' claims. In any event, Hales' Complaint expressly challenged whether
77

Defendants' asserted costs were "legitimate and reasonable," and their Counterclaim
Answer incorporated their Complaint. The Hales' Complaint also specifically puts the
Mechanic's Lien Act at issue, alleging the invalidity of the lien, slander of title on the
basis of the claimed Mechanic's Lien, and abuse of the lien right.

The issues,

moreover, were clearly presented to the court at trial (see Rule 15(b), Utah R. Civ. P.).24
POINT IV. JAMES HORSLEY HAD ACTUAL AND APPARENT
AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT THE $30,000 PAYMENT,
AND HALES PROPERLY MARSHALED THE
EVIDENCE.
Rather than challenging the Hales legal arguments with respect to James Horsley,
Defendants assert only that the Hales failed to marshal the evidence; however, the Hales
properly marshaled the evidence as to the findings that they challenge. Defendants assert
that Hales omitted: "1. The Hales decided to make the check payable to James, not Big
H." Consol Brief dX 34. But, the Hales' Brief says, "the Hales wrote a check to James
Horsley." Hales' Brief at 37. Defendants argue that the Hales did not state, "2. James
was not a shareholder, officer or director of Big H." Consol. Brief at 34. Yet, the brief
states, "James testified that he was not ever an officer, director or shareholder in Big H."
21

R. 57-60.
R. 1-34.
23
Id
24
R. 1863-67,76.
22

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
22may contain errors.

Hales' Brief at 38. Defendants assert that the Hales did not state, "3. There is no
evidence that James appears on any Big H records maintained by the Utah Division of
Corporations." Consol Brief at 34. But, the Hales cited this verbatim. Hales9 Brief'at
37. Defendants assert that the Hales failed to state: "4. At the time James received the
$30,000 check, the Hales knew that their failure to pay the agreed-upon ten percent fee to
Big H had created enormous tensions between James and Dwayne (Horsley), leading to
numerous arguments between them." Consol Brief at 34. However, the Hales did state,
"Mr. Hale's testimony could be read to indicate that he knew James was not receiving
draws from Big H, and that James could not induce Dwayne to pay him. In addition,
Mr. Hale testified that he knew that James and Dwayne were 'estranged5 at the time that
he paid James the $30,000." Hales' Brief at 38, 40 n.57. Also, "the Hales were aware
that there were 'enormous tensions' between Dwayne and James." Id. at 42. Next,
Defendants assert that the Hales' brief fails to acknowledge that "The Hales well knew
that James wanted the check to pursue a personal investment opportunity in a start-up
mortgage company." Consol Brief at 34. But, the Hales acknowledged this finding
verbatim. Hales' Brief at 42. Defendants also argue that the Hales did not marshal:
"6. The Hales failed to designate Big H as a joint payee on the check." Consol Brief at
34. Yet, the Hales stated, "the Hales wrote a check to James Horsley." Hales' Brief at 37
(emphasis added). Defendants also argue that the Hales did not marshal evidence in
support of the trial court's finding at R. 2123 f 39 that it was "otherwise unreasonable"
for the Hales to have expected James to apply the payment to Big H. However, the Hales
did marshal the evidence with respect to the portions of that conclusion that they
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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challenged, and the unchallenged portions do not require marshalling.

"A party

challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). It goes without saying that fact findings
that are not challenged do not need to be marshaled. In short, Hales challenged the trial
court's conclusions at 39a and b that James did not have actual or apparent authority, and
properly marshaled the evidence in support of those points.
In addition, Defendants assert that the Hales did not marshal the evidence
supporting the findings that, "Before they sued Big H, the Hales never informed Big H or
Horsley of the existence of the payment, or of their position that it was supposed to be a
credit to their account with Big H" and, "At the point the Hales issued the check to
James, they were in an adversarial relationship with Big H, making it incumbent upon
them to clearly inform Big H of the payment to assure that it was aware of it." To the
extent that there is a dispute as to whether James was a part of "Big H," the Hales
properly marshaled any evidence that would support a conclusion that he was not. Hales'
Brief at 37-38, 40 n.58, 41 (acknowledging the evidence that James was not an officer,
director or shareholder in Big H; that James does not appear in the corporate records; that
there was some testimony that James was not a employee of Big H; and that the Hales

The Hales did not expressly or impliedly challenge portions of the court's findings that
support this conclusion. Specifically, "7. The Hales failed to have James (or Big H) sign
a restrictive endorsement" and "The Hales, in their entire history of their profitable
family business, had never before issued to an individual (such as James) a check
supposedly intended for a business entity creditor (such as Big H). . . . Mrs. Hale
testified at trial [that] when she paid accounts on behalf of the family business (BC), she
was always careful to assure that invoices were paid to the correct payee, since she knew
it is difficult to recover the payment if it is directed to the wrong creditor.55
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knew that James was subordinate to Dwayne). The Hales do not challenge the remainder
of these findings, and therefore had no duty to marshal the evidence supporting them.
The Hales therefore request that this Court consider the substance of their legal argument,
points which the Defendants entirely ignore.
POINT V.

ALL OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY THIS APPEAL ARE
ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED IN HALES' OPENING
BRIEF.

Hales rely on their opening brief for the remaining issues of warranty repair costs
and Defendants' wrongful liening of Hales' properly. For the reasons set out therein, the
trial court should have included the only competent evidence concerning the cost of
repairs to Defendants5 defective workmanship on the houses (which both experts agreed
was necessary); further, Defendants should answer for having asserted a lien in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25.
DATED this 5th day of July, 2011.
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC

Vincent C. Rampton
Kathleen E. McDonald
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Hales' Reply Brief was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this
5th day of July, 2011:
John T. Anderson
Anderson & Karrenberg
50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for
Big H Construction, Inc.
Bradley L. Tilt
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State Street, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2323
Attorneys for
CitiMortgage, Inc.
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Invoice

i

^aMMWmas
^iijiiirmiti

DATE

INVOICE*

J./29/2004

1011

BILL T O
Hale, Chuck
(TifEani & Jr/s Home)
Lot $46 11136 S Sir Barton Ln
SoJordan, UT

DESCRIPTION
Upstair? Kitchen tops (Cambria Park Gate)
Add for Ogee edge
Laundry room tops with under mounted sink
Add for Ogee edge
Master bath - 3 tops, phistadius top in water closet (Travertine)
AddforOgee edge
Basement Kitchen tops with bade splash & under mounting of sink
Add for ogee edge
Basement bath room (Travertine)
AddforOgee edge
Powder room tatb
Add for Ogee edge
Main Bathroom -with under mounted sink (Travertine)
Add for Ogee edge

QTY

UNIT/RATE
6,048.00
1,050.00
2,047.00
288.00
1.730.00
210.00
4,620.00
1.312.00
819.00
153.00
655.00
158.00
789.00
121.00

Total

AMOUNT
6,048.00
1.050.00
2t047.00
288.00
2.730.00
210.00
4;620.00
1312,00
8)9.00
153.00
655.00
158.00
789.00
121.00

$21,000.00

BIG H 0454
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Statement
DATE
4/9/20O4

Mmmfnmmm
Ta
(Ti&w Air/3 Home)
Lot #46 11136 S. Sir Bate* LA
g a t o t a * ITT

AMOUNT DOE

TRANSACTION

DATE

&mnm
owmm

BALANCE

AMOUNT

BxHaax fbrwasd

mv#jon
JNVI1071
INVj5fl072

|1I

01/28/2004
01/29/2004

Sl,m«T

0.00
.21,000.00
21,420.00
.21,780,00

]
;
I
i
•

11

AMOUNT DUE

$21,780.00

'
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10/30/2006 ION 15:29 FAI 8015610099 RT Custom Cabinetry inc,

Invoice
i

DATE

INVOICED

j

4/8/2004

1072

WH-5W3535 Fax 801-561-0099
BILLTO
Hale, Chufles & Beverly
10864 So. 2420 W.
So.JosJaii, UT 84095

DESCRIPTION
Valances aioimd mirror (remake) for Jr, s IKWSC
! Electrical wtak in bath forJr.sliousc
I Electrical work in island for Jr. s honse
Remake sink support for Jr, s house

XTTY
1

UNIT/RATE

AMOUNT

175.00
15-00
130.00
40.00

Total
DUE UPON (X5MPIBTION OF WORK/ JOB.
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175.00
15.00
130.00
40.00

$360.00

j

mil tiifismi

D»te:JLj^L_2ott.

PROPOSAL AND CONTRACT
AGREEMENT
We (R.T. Custom Cabinetry inc.) propose to provide all necessary materials and labor to manufacture and or install all
cabinetry and or countertops in a substantial workmanlike order as according to trade standards or customer satisfaction for:

^

4-

-I

Worktobe performed at:

—=^_

,

Lpr^46 ~ 1115b 5. &( (km* C

c
_

As covered in the specifications and or drawings provided, for the s^m of:

$ \Y\

\. > <3J

JDollars. To be paid under
the terms tojpliow: 50% deposit upon ^ening of this apeement, balance dueuprjn^nipletion of services covered herein.

£D0]i^ ft !%•£-

We are maintaimifig a six to eight week production lead-time. New jobs are added to the production schedule only after a contract, deposit,
and completefloorplan - including but not limited to; decision on all options, choices, appliance specifications, final measuremtaits and or any
information pertinent to the manufacturing and or installation of the proposed project. When the aforementioned items and information are
provided and complete, you will be informed in writing of the next available completion/installation date. We ask you, the consumer to choose
from the available completion and or installation dates and guarantee readiness of the proposed job-site.
We will manufacture to achieve the scheduled date and hereby offer a $30 per day discount if delivery and installation of the said project
fells behind schedule. (Based on a four day work week) Jn the event job she readiness falls behind the scheduled delivery/installation date, your
cabinetry and or produced project shall be warehoused at an additional cost to you of $30 per day. (Based on a four day work week) In the event
the project need be warehoused for more than eight days (Based on afourday work week) full and total amount of this agreement, less
installation price, shall be invoiced and become due and payable.
Delivery/installation of such postponed projects shall be rescheduled at our availability and negotiated upon job-site readiness. We operate
> a tight schedule, but can typically reschedule installs within ten working days. ([Based on a four day work week)
No plumbing, electrical, flooring, decorating or other construction work shall be performed unless specified in the drawings and or
specifications provided and covered herein. (Openingsforappliances and or sinks shall be built or cut to the specifications provided by you, the
consumer, or your representative (appliance or sink provider) as per cutout spedfications. In the event incorrect information is provided, a
service charge and or change order may be necessary to modify or rebuild the project to current altered specifications provided.
We shall deliver and install this project as per this agreement as carefully and proficiently as possible. We shall not assume or be held liable
for any job-site damage toflooring,walls, ceilings etc. unless such damage is negligent and careless on our behalf It is advised that finished
flooring and moldings be installed after installation of cabinetry to avoid any damage that may result in standard and typical installation
procedures. On remodels we ask that the room be clear of appliances or objects that may hinder the placement and installation of isabinetry.
It is specifically understood that all items manufactured by R.T. Custom Cabinetry inc., both in the shop and or on the job-site, will Temain
the property of R.T. Custom Cabinetry inc. until 100% paid for in full. We retain therightupon breach of this agreement by the purchaser to sell
those items in our possession. In effecting any resale on breach of this agreement by the purchaser, we shall be deemed to act in the capacity of
agent for th&purchaser. The purchaser shall be liable for any net deficiency on resale.

ID To- 3ml

^

A 5% discount shall be given if payment is received immediately upon installation/completion. In the event payment is not received within
ten (10) calendar days, we reserve therightto charge interest in the amount of 2% per month, not to exceed 24% per year. At twenty (20) days
past due, it is customary to file notice of intent to lien. In the event a collection agency or legal representation is necessary, yoti, the purchaser
agreetoreimburseus, R.T. Custom Cabinetry inc. for any reasonable amounts expended in order to collect 100% of the total contract balance.
Deposit d a t e : l Q / 2 ^ / u j C h e c k # 3JJ1
1
Submitted by:
1 W^X

Amount of deposit:J

Title:

.—^jamm*
ACCEPTANCE
You (R/T. Cijstom^abinetry inc.) are hereby authorized to furnish all the materials and labor required to complete the work
mentioned in the proposal and contract agreement above, for which I/we agree to pay the amounts mentioned in said proposal and
\ccording to the terms thereof
Acceptedbv:X Y j -

, .-.

L i WC*^Z^

Date: /£>/&f

2Qg>
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BIG H 0456

invoice
DATE

INVOICE*

1/29V2004

ton

BJLLTO
Hate, Chock
(Tiffittil&Jr^Homc)
Lot # 4 £ l l 136 & Sk jBartoei Lo
SaJatfan. OT

DESCRIPTION

UNF17RATE

QTY

1 Upstairs Kitchen tops (Cambria Park Gate)
j Add fir Ogre edge
1 Laundry room top* wiih tsider joomfaed sink
1 AddfarOgee edge
Mtotcr bath - 3 iop&pita radius top m water doact (Travertine) '
[Add far Ogee edge
\B*KjmajtT?ndKtiU^miAhb^$fA*&
& wider iriaxomgofwok
1 Add far ogee edge
Bajcmem bath room (Travertine)
' Addfcr Ogee edge
wderrooifl bafcb.
._-ddfor0*cc edge
,;%
Main Bathroon with imSer mounted sink (Travertine)
AddfrrQgxe<tee

1

I

6,048.00
1,050.00
2,047.00
218.00
2,730.00
210.00
4*20.00
1,312.00
819.00
153.00
655.00
158.00
789-00
121.00

AMOUNT
6,0*8.00
LO50.00
2^047.00
2884)0
2,730.00
210.00
-4,620.00
U 12.00
819.00
153.00
655.00
158.00
789.00
121.00

•

|

—'

:

Total
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521,000.00

BCU 008

45

46

47
48
49
50
51

52

53

54
55

56
57

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

67 J

I Craftsmen Tile
i Craftsmen Tile
I Craftsmen Tile
1 Craftsmen Tile
1 R.T Custom Cabinets
1 R.T Custom Cabinets
1 R.T Custom Cabinets
I R.T Custom Cabinets
1 R.T Custom Cabinets
1 R.T Custom Cabinets
1 R.T Custom Cabinets
CR Painting
CR Painting
CR Painting
CR Painting
CR Painting
' CR Painting
Sure Appliances
Sure Appliances
Tanner Glass
Tanner Glass
Garage Door Center
Garage Door Center
Capitol Rain Gutters
Capital Rain Gutters
Big H Construction
Big H Construction
Big H Construction
Big H Construction
Questar Gas
Questar Gas
Questar Gas
Questar Gas
City of South Jordan
City of South Jordan
City of South Jordan
City of South Jordan
Valley Ready Mix
Utah Power
Utah Power
Utah Power
Utah Power
Bonnie Reynolds
Sunline Landscaping
Sunline Landscaping
Sunline Landscaping
Sunline Landscaping
Sunline Landscaping
Sunline Landscaping
Sunline Landscaping
Sunline Landscaping
Sunline Landscaping
Sunline Landscaping
Sunline Landscape
CHS Construction
CHS Construction
Artisan Stairways
Artisan Stairways
Mark Campbell
Mark Campbell
Meitler Metal Works
Old World Stone
At Home Furnishings
Valley Sand & Gravel
Valley Sand & Gravel
BMC West
BMC West
Water Essentials
Diamond Rental

1 Tile/Medallions
1 Tile labor
1 Tile labor
I Tile Labor
1 Cabinets
1 Cabinets
1 Cabinets
1 Cabinets
| Countertops
1 Payment
1 Payment
1 Painting
1 Painting
| Painting
Payment
Payment
Payment
Appliances
Payment
Door knobs
Payment
Garage doors
Payment
Rain gutters
Payment
Framing labor
Framing labor
Framing labor
Finish labor
Service agreement
Temp gas
Payment
Payment
Water
Water
Water
Water
concrete
Temp power
Temp power
Temp power
Temp Power
Final clean
Landscaping
LandscapingAvtrfall/rock walls

Inv#336
lnv#345
CH#23074 F.U.B $17,000
CH#3 J 54 Big H $10,000
CH03342 Big H $17,000

1
1
|
1
1
1
1
1

CH#23085 F.U.B $14,682.02
Inv#3000479
CH#3495 Big H $2,763.42
lnv#615218
CH#22207 F.U.B $3,662.00
Inv#2l
CH#23076 F.U.B $1,842.75
CH#020110 F.U.B
CH#018361 F.U.B
CH#018511 F.U.B
CH#21J 3331 Beehive $ 15,000.00
CH#18220 F.U.B
CH#23078 F.U.B
Big H
Big H
CHtfOOOOl9529 F.U.B
Big H
BigH
BigH
lnv#53023CH#019074 F.U.B
BigH
CH#000020106 F.U.B
CH#000019525 F.U.B
CH#18216 F.U.B
Hales
Inv#900 $79,000
Inv #502 $50,000

Payment
Payment
Payment
| Payment
Payment
Payment
Payment
Payment

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

CH#126 Hales $30,500
CH#139 Hales $10,000
CH#225 Hales $14,250
CH#262 Hales $14,250
OW3542 Hales $15,000
CH#3557 Hales $15,000
CH#2113236 Beehive C.U
James

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
|

Inv#l112
CJW3237 BigH $1,494.00
Inv#9182
Cashiers check James Horsley $6,000.00
Charged to lot 45 $1,168.00
Charged to Lot 45 $8,976.00
CH# 126 Hales
Visa Tiffany Hale
Visa Big H $935.00 Remainder Tiffany
Inv#46410CH# 18221 F.U.B
Inv#46437 CH# 18221 F.U.B $1,938.36
BigH
CH#18214 F.U.B
Quote 30497 Hales
CH#3269 Big H

Hang Doors
Payment
Rails/payment
Rails/payment
Finish work
Finish work
Exterior rails
Sinks
1 Credenza
Gravel
Gravel
Lumber for temp rail
Stakes / Tapes
Water purifier
| Heaters

!

T Payable to Arizona tile CH#20974 F.U.B
None CH//20977 F.U.B
None/ Big H
Balance to date CH#23084 F.U.B
lnv#1011
lnv#1071
lnv#1072
Down Payment
Inv#10Il
CH#21149 J 3 Beehive $21,000.00

j

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$2,220.00
$9,800.00
$5,289.00
$7,349.50
$21,000.00
$420.00
$360.00
$19,736.00
$21,000.00

| -0-

$17,000.00
$17,176.00
$2,865.00

-0-0-

-0-0-0- j
-0-0-

-0-

$14,682.02

-0-0-

_$2,763.42

-Q-\

$3,662.00

-0-0-

$1,842.75
$18,500.00
$14,300.00
$10,000.00
i $15,000.00
$116.86
$420.29

$30.64
$29.92
$26.68
$56.45
$2,505.10
$19.97
$55.69
$22.45
$86.62
$2,360.00

-0-0-0-0-0-0-

-0-0-

-0-

-0-

$10,000.00
-0-0-0-0-0-01
$1,494.00
$6,000.00

-0-0-

$8,197.50
1 $1,211.25
$2,805.71
$620.41
$1,317.95
$385.60
1 $101.78
$5,496.25
$417.87

-0-

